What do we want: Illiberal Democracy?

            Eighteen years ago this time in Burma, only one voice of the people was heard.  The voice resounded throughout the country from 8 August 1988 to September 18 that year, the day of the military takeover.  Those six weeks may be marked as the weeks of democracy in Burma. 

            The people took to the streets, risking their lives in sporadic rainfalls of bullets from the government troops.  The whole country in unison was speaking only one language then.  The language of ‘democracy.’  The people yelled: ‘Democracy: Our Cause!  Victory to the Revolution! Victory to the Revolution!’ 

            Eighteen years on, the Burmese people’s desire for a democratic system in their country has not been materialized.  The demand for democracy has been effectively silenced inside Burma, save for the frequent statements of a handful of relentless and courageous activists from National League for Democracy.  The opposition in exile has been fractured and weakened while the military has consolidated its power through purges and promotions within its elite clique.

            Even though the opposition still lacks a tangible plan to democratize Burma, other than relying on sanctions imposed by the West and desperately hoping for another mass  uprising, the military regime has come up with their road map to democracy.

            In the 1988 uprising, and again in the 1990 elections, the Burmese people made it clear that they wanted a multi-party liberal democratic system and they did not need the tatmadaw, or armed forces, in their political culture.  The ruling generals, on the other hand, have reservations on liberal democracy and its ideals.  They doubt that, different forms of liberal democracy, from  United States’ neo-liberal democracy to Nordic countries’ social democracy, will work in Burma. 

            Indeed the junta’s rationale for denying democratic rights to the Burmese people has been more practical than philosophical.  The military leadership is most aware that a genuine democratic system will not prolong their role in the politics of future Burma.  Besides the generals know that they might even have to face rough justice by the Burmese masses or international justice by the Hague once they are out of power and democracy is restored in Burma. 

            Lucky for them, the emergency exit from the dilemma of being constantly pressured towards democracy and being reluctant to give it to the Burmese people presented itself in the political systems of some of the countries in the region.  Various models of Southeast Asia’s ‘illiberal democracy,’ from Singapore‘s ‘disciplined democracy’ to Indonesia’s ‘guided democracy’ came to the rescue of the Burmese junta. 

            ‘Illiberal democracy’ may be an oxymoron but the term may best describe some of Southeast Asia’s political systems.  It is illiberal in that the system does not tolerate dissent and does not guarantee individual freedom and rights.  Essentially the notion of the universality of human rights is challenged in an illiberal democracy.  Asia’s contemporary political philosophers such as Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohammad hold that Asians have Asian values, as opposed to universal human values.  It is democracy in that it features some traits of democracy such as elections and parliamentary system.  Illiberal democracy also gives opportunities to those who no longer want to beat the system to join the system.  

            It should be obvious now that there is no way that the military may relinquish power for the sake of a genuinely democratic system envisioned by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.  The junta’s road map to democracy will lead the country to 2008 elections, which can be seen as the major legitimating tool for the military rule. 

            We may call it Pyinmana democracy, after the site of the new Myanmar capital in Pyinmana.  According to Pyinmana democracy, the junta will have eliminated all the formidable opposition forces by the time of the scheduled elections in 2008. 

            Most likely, Aung San Suu Kyi will still remain under house arrest if something untoward does not happen to her.  The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), modeled after Indonesia’s Golkar, the party established and promoted by the regime, will win the elections. 

            The USDA will further legitimize the junta, safeguard the interest of the military elite and rule the country the way People’s Action Party (PAP) does in Singapore.  Like its brother parties, the USDA, once it gains incumbency, will further depoliticize the population with its thuggish intimidation tactics.  But it is doubtful whether the USDA will be able to emulate PAP in terms of bringing the country to peace and prosperity.

            If the Burmese people are to be coerced towards Pyinmana democracy, the Burmese expression ‘Given but not gotten.  Fed but not filled!’ may best express their situation.  On the other hand, the doers of realpolitik in the opposition, claiming that they know what is best for the Burmese people, are already swimming with the tide.  At the end of the day, it will be up to the people, living inside Burma, to decide whether they deserve liberal democracy or Pyinamna democracy. 

Ko Ko Thett     

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Comments

Latt said _

This is an interesting article. I agree with Ko Theet about the three classes, and I'd like to add peasant and proletariat classes which the Burmese society has undermobilized. To me, the whole pro-democracy groups including armed groups haven't been able to penetrate these two classes that constitute a large part constitute majority population. With intense globalization and emigration, I think it wouldn't be wrong to say that Burma has transnational prolitariate class. Rather than pulling these classes into the orbit of democracy movements past and present, they are just set as mere supporters (moral & financial) of the movement. But after 18 years, the supporters are increasingly becoming suspicious of the opposition groups, while the student and monk classes (if we can claim as classes) have been paralyzed. For this reason, I see three different splits: ruling regime, transnational opposition groups and the rest of the society. Perhaps in a loose sense, can they be seem as post-88 social classes?

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