04.03.2007
Letter to Editor: Three Questions on UNSC
Both
Dr San Oo Aung and
Taisamyone stress the need, in their
latest articles in "Burma Digest", for an analysis of "what went wrong" and "why
the Resolution failed" at the UN Security Council on 12 January 2007.
Might I suggest three lines of enquiry?
1. The first is to analyse the public statements of both China and Russia since
October 2004 when "The Situation in Myanmar" was first raised during informal
"Consultations" of Council members. You will find that both China and Russia
have consistently argued "on the record" that the issue should not be on the
Council agenda, and they have opposed all discussion and declined even to
comment on the detail of the draft Resolution circulated by the US. Even before
"The Situation in Myanmar" was formally accepted on the Council agenda on 15
September 2006, China's Ambassador at the UN Wang Guanggya had told James Traub
of the New York Times (in a wide-ranging interview on 3 September 2006) that he
had "firm instructions to block a US Resolution" on Burma. We should not then be
in the least surprised when the Chinese and Russians both acted as they
repeatedly said they would.
2. The second is to review the debate which has now been going on for some time
about reform of the Security Council, in which China has championed the cause of
the Group of 77 (now 131 members) and of the Non-Aligned Movement (now 118
members). In the same interview with James Traub, Ambassador Wang is quoted as
complaining about the "tyranny of the minority in the Council" (i.e the US and
the UK) and vowing that there would be "implications for future discussions".
What happened on 12 January 2007 was Ambassador Wang's revenge. It was also
Defence Minister Lekota who crystallized South African thinking on this issue
when he said: "We cannot support a situation in which issues which need to be
considered by bigger proportions of the members of the UN are hived off and
become a special preserve of a few privileged nations." (Bua News - South Africa
- 14 February 2007). None of this really has anything to do with Burma's
problems, but is very important for an understanding of why the vote on 12
January 2007 went the way it did. The vote seems to me to have been an early
exchange of artillery between the Established Order (UK, US, France) and the
Aspiring World (China, Russia, India) in the battle for the soul of the Security
Council, its expansion to around 25 members from the present 15 and the struggle
for the revision of its functions, competence and responsibilities. The New York
Times of 13 January 2007 quoted US Under-Secretary of State for Political
Affairs R Nicholas Burns as saying. "We forced this issue onto the agenda for
one reason. The Security Council is the only place that can deal with human
rights." Precisely. Forget about any "threat to the security and stability of
the region" - that was only the pretence for putting Burma on the Council's
agenda, in a situation where no country in the region had complained about any
threat, and indeed most of them had said that it was not helpful that Burma had
been put on the agenda, and that the rejection of the draft Resolution was the
right decision.
3. The third is to ask why the US decided to press for a vote in the Council
which they knew for certain they were going to lose. Did they simply
miscalculate? Were they perhaps clearing the decks for more important issues
like the "surge" of US troops to Iraq? Were they anxious to get closer to China
and Russia over Iran and North Korea (on which China has been generally
helpful)? Were the US simply picking up a few easy "brownie" points in their
global campaign for freedom and democracy? Was the "Washington Post" right when
it reported that President Bush and Condoleezza Rice had overruled State
Department misgivings about pressing for a vote? Why give the military junta
such a propaganda victory, at as time which is so helpful to them in the run-up
to the final session(s) of their National Convention? Is Burma now seen in
Washington as "expendable" in the expectation of Chinese concessions, for
example, over Darfur? In short, having got Burma on to the agenda, why go for so
hasty a vote whose result was a foregone conclusion? Why disappoint the people
of Burma, further expose the NLD and entrench the military junta? I do not find
easy answers to these questions.
Derek Tonkin
25 February 2007
.
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