04.03.2007
Workshop on Political Development in Burma
_ BURMA DIGEST news report
We learnt this week that there’s a workshop to discuss the political developments in Burma, in Bangkok Thailand; sponsored by Asian Political and International Studies Association.
A number of Burmese scholars and academics, and a few international friends of Burma participated in the work shop. Some pro-junta advocates and junta’s representatives also attended the workshop.
The Junta send it men non other than the nephew of Senior Gen. Than Swe. He just sat down and did not speak a word, but is very courteous, and only at the last moment the Nephew spoke up and challenge the sanctions. Many a professor argued it back. At last someone challenged him that the U S government will stop the sanctions if the junta would stop all the 7 points sanctions which the Junta has imposed on the people and so he shut up then_ great!
They imposed the Chatham House Rule of confidentiality on the discussions in the workshop. According to the Chatham House Rule of confidentiality we cannot report by name of who said what, but can report the essence of discussions thematically.
Abstracts of Discussions
1. A new government in Burma/Myanmar in 2010?
Burma/Myanmar could have a new government in 2010. This prediction is derived from a simple calculation based on Burma/Myanmar’s road map for democracy. It is likely, that after 14 years, the military government will finish its constitutional convention this year. The next critical steps in its political roadmap - writing the actual constitution, holding a referendum on the charter, and finally a national election, etc., could unfold over the next three years. Burma/Myanmar will then establish “disciplined democracy” – a form of indirect military rule. However, whether this junta-directed transition moves forward still depends on many political and personal factors, such as the health of Burma’s paramount leader Snr. General Than Shwe, and who will succeeds him as the junta’s top leader. Other critical factors influencing the outcome include the junta’s sense of security in power and that its internal threats, including the NLD and others pro-democracy groups and ethnic minorities have been effectively controlled or neutralized, the outcome of the referendum on the constitution, and whether the junta believes that its proxy political wing, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, which is expected to evolve into a political party, can secure a sizable win in elections. The prospects for political transition to proceed will also depend on whether the junta can successfully demobilize armed ethnic groups within the next three years. Active engagement from Asean and China could also affect the pace of change.
2. Burma’s prospects for a transition to democracy: An analysis from a non-academic perspective
It is an accepted fact that change will come about in Burma in one way or another. When it does come about, the preferred means in this civilized world will hopefully be in a non-violent manner. I will look at the various scenarios that have taken place and after analyzing them, will try and come up with additional suggestions that might work to bring about reconciliation within the country. These suggested alternatives will not be, by any means, sure answers to the dire situation in the country but by presenting them at the forum; it could generate some discussion and perhaps become food for further thoughts and ideas.
In looking for solutions, an analysis will be made on why the generals are still in power as well as why they want to maintain their power. In the process, one would have to look into the psyche of the top generals as well as those who are in line for future leadership. This analysis may help find ways and means to bring the generals to the negotiating table. Similarly, an analysis would have to be made of the opposition forces, viz., the NLD and the ethnic nationalities; to look into the reason why their efforts have failed to bring the generals to the negotiating table in the past and to look at possible avenues for making their overtures more palatable from the point of view of the military.
3. Looking inside the Burmese military
The Burmese military, which is considered to be a relatively united organization, is not monolithic. It has experienced factional struggles at different levels in the power structure that have led to various purges and splits including the 2004 major purge of the whole military intelligence structure. Although power has appeared to be consolidated around Gen. Than Shwe after the 2004 MI purge, his declining health is likely to pave the way for a re-diversifying of power. This power reconfiguration with different factions inside the military appears to be one of the main determining factors for any kind of change (political, economic and social) to come in Burma. If a more reform-minded leader or clique takes a leading role in the future, there may be more space to begin a process of genuine national reconciliation.
4. Political evolution in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
The workshop mandates a focus on issues of political reform, in my case the SRV. While objection can be raised as to whether state-society relations as well as the nature of governance in the SRV can be adequately labeled ‘communist’ as in the workshop proposal, it remains without doubt that most aspects of politics in Vietnam is dominated by what happens within a single party – the Vietnamese Communist Party. Political reform in Vietnam can chiefly be described as evolutionary, beginning formally from around 1986, although political-economy wise reforms from the grassroots started much earlier. Casting the grassroots perspective aside for the moment, political reforms in Vietnam generates several issues. These are phrased in terms of looking backwards, and looking forwards.
Looking backwards, it may be possible to make a case that it is not possible to argue whether it would have been better for the country to have adopted a “big-bang” approach, or the current “economics first, politics second” approach. Nor is the point that the ends justify the means a fully satisfying view, although most pundits and politically inclined Vietnamese have come to accept that the approach taken was right. In any case, proponents of the big bang approach continue to stake their reputation on the prediction that the lack of quicker-paced (even instantaneous) political reforms will set the country backwards and even cause the country to soon collapse under the overweight of the Vietnamese Communist Party.
Looking forwards, this presentation looks at how this doomsday scenario might or might not take place. It focuses on the following issues. One, it is argued that while one party politics does put down society and political aspirations in general (which become stronger naturally as a result of economic development) there are safety valves that allow the dissipation of this tension. Here a brief examination of state-society relations would illuminate the matter. The issue then, of course, is not that Vietnamese do not aspire to democracy when they acquiesced to one-party politics, but that a much freer set of state-society relations than what one-party states would normally prescribe and practice delay their desire for immediate democratic gratification. The second issue is to what extent good governance in Vietnam, something that the Vietnamese Communist Party now aspires to and aim at through its various internal, governmental, and social reforms, will further delay and even pre-empt pressures on the VCP to adopt a liberal model of politics.
5. Cutting the Burmese Gordian knot
The Union of Burma, which came into being mainly through the effort of Bogyoke Aung San, founded in 1948 was beset by trouble since its inception and the end result was that there was a military coup in 1962 that grips on to power up to this day, under different pretext. In the contention between two schools of thought, the one headed by the democrat, wants the real Union of Burma by consensus and the other led by the Burman (Myanmar) chauvinist, wanted to rough ride shot over the ethnic nationalities with the intentions of creating one race (Burman/Myanmar), one language (Burmese/Myanmanese) and one religion Buddhism. This rationale became one of the reasons of changing the country name from Burma to Myanmar. This group became predominant because it controls the armed forces and became the source of all the troubles.
The majority of the democrats hitherto led by Boyoke Aung San suffered because he died prematurely and only after several decades did his young daughter was able to take up the struggle again. As the world already knows she was supported by the mass of the people and the international community. But the Generals would not relent and up to this moment the guns precedes over reason. No matter what Daw Aung San Suu Kyi AND nld tried to negotiate with the top brass Generals there was no avail. At this stage the power comes out of the barrel of the gun. True to its convictions it embarked on the ethnic cleansing policy.
Nobody on earth ever trusted the Burmese Junta because unlike other governments it lies the very concept of truth. People who have tried to negotiate with them has seen so many Munich as in Nazi Hitler, there seem to have no choice for negotiations unless one speaks from the position of strength. This paper will outline of how to approach the tyrannical Junta.
6. The myths of Panglong: Ethnicity and the prospects for national unity in Burma
Contemporary ethnic identity in Burma has been fundamentally shaped by the legacy of the Panglong Agreement of 1947. At this historic conference, representatives from several of Burma’s ethnic minorities met with ethnic majority Burman leaders to sign a document that would facilitate the handover of power from the British and determine Burma’s borders and fate as a modern nation-state. The initial circumstances of participation in or exclusion from this crucial event in Burma’s history played a prominent role in determining the ways in which different ethnic minority groups chose to demonstrate their opposition to the Burmese government over the next thirty years. In this paper I investigate the effects of the Panglong agreement on Burma’s ethnic minority groups and argue that an understanding of ethnicity and the prospects for ethnic unity in Burma can be best achieved by a thorough examination of the ‘myths of Panglong.’
The salience of ethnicity as a factor in conflict remains a contested topic, but an understanding of the tempestuous relationship between ethnic identity and national identity (when the two are not necessarily one and the same) is absolutely necessary in identifying why national unity remains an elusive concept in multi-ethnic nations like Burma. This relationship can be effectively understood by studying the dominant myths in a given society and determining the points at which they fail to resonate with certain groups and individuals.
The history of Panglong presented here includes perspectives that are not part of the official version, yet the story of this decisive event remains incomplete. In my analysis I look at three different versions (attributed to the government, the democratic opposition, and the ethnic minorities) of the ‘myth of Panglong,’ pointing out the limitations of each and suggesting some ways in which a reappraisal of Panglong could provide a vehicle for more effective discussions of national unity in Burma. As a national myth, Panglong is critical to deciphering the persistent ethnic conflict that has plagued Burma since independence, but only if this ‘common history’ can be reinterpreted in a way that recognizes the complexities of ethnic diversity within the Burmese state and the inescapable conflict between national identity and ethnic identity.
7. Burma/Myanmar political reform vis-à-vis the new constitution
The ruling junta in Burma/Myanmar claims that its new constitution will serve as the enduring basis for stable government in the multi-ethnic country. But the draft charter also looks set to enshrine strong military prerogatives that are likely to be contested by other sections of society in the aftermath of the roadmap. For instance, the military government has 25% seats in all legislatures be reserved for its un-elected representatives from the armed forces. It has also reserved the right to declare a state of emergency, cabinet quotas for military men, an army free from any public scrutiny. The state structure also looks set to favor the Burman majority. Taken together, these prerogatives are mechanisms for the armed forces to protect its privileges under the status quo such as its lucrative patron-client system, its political control of the market, and its influence in all aspects of governance – to name but a few. Yet the inflexible procedures for amending the constitutions – particularly those aspects that affect military prerogatives - will inhibit any meaningful transformation to democracy. While the Burmese army has a history of abolishing and reintroducing constitutions, the opposition – both ethnic and democratic – will target it, due to its lop-sided nature in favor of military power. Thus, the durability of the constitution is called into question, as is its suitability as foundation for gradual democratization.
8. Reporting ‘Burma’: The 2005 adoption of Nay Pyi Daw as Myanmar’s new capital
Here my argument is that the creation of the new capital near Pyinmana was consistent with several important strands in Burmese history either ignored or misunderstood by the international media. However, I also argue that such misunderstandings were largely induced by the Myanmar government itself, through its forty-five year suppression of press freedoms.
9. Burma-China: A fraught relationship
China has been Burma’s key ally since the military seized power on 18 September 1988. Beijing as been Rangoon’s key supplier of military hardware and in recent years the country’s most important economic partner. This support for the military regime has even extended to being their main champion in the international arena, including using its veto at the UN Security Council against the US-sponsored resolution. But this close relationship is not without its problems for Beijing.
This paper looks at the extent of Chinese involvement in Burma, their concerns and expectations, and the Burmese response to them. It examines China’s strategic aims in Burma. The thrust of the paper is that there is a medium-term strategic relationship, fostered by Chinese national goals and international reaction to Burma – Indian competition for influence and the western approach of isolation and sanctions. But Burma’s relationship with Beijing cannot be characterised as a client-state.
10. Building a democratic circle around Myanmar
The United States’ Myanmar policy, comprising broad economic and political sanctions, B-listing on Washington’s roster of pariah states, and ongoing attempts to trigger UN action, is both laudable and in disarray. The paper examines the difficult internal and external environments that characterize the Myanmar case, noting in particular the challenges generated by a growing China syndrome, and considers how the US might recast its policy. It argues that the best way forward would be to build a democratic circle around Myanmar. Initially the membership could be small, perhaps limited to Australia, India and Japan, and the objectives limited. Over time, however, the initiative could become more ambitious, reaching out both to neighbouring states and to a range of international bodies. Equally, the objectives could extend beyond empowerment of civil society to attempts to boost military confidence in non-military institutions. In conclusion, the paper holds that Myanmar presents US policy makers with a key strategic opportunity to (a) reanimate an agenda of democracy promotion with widespread latent support, (b) boost US interests in a critical buffer state, (c) confront at the level of values the so-called Beijing Consensus, focused on economic growth in authoritarian settings, (d) give real substance to US demands that China assume the role of responsible regional stakeholder, and (e) enable Washington to play the good guy in global politics to good effect instead of merely claiming the moral high ground to no discernable effect.
11. The UN Security Council and Myanmar: Power politics at work
The defeat on 12 January 2007 of a draft Resolution sponsored in the UN Security Council by the United States and the United Kingdom and designed to encourage the military junta in Myanmar to initiate democratic reforms disappointed many. To some however it came as no surprise at all that China and Russia vetoed the draft. More importantly, their vetoes reflected Chinese and Soviet concerns about US pressures to reform the Security Council and expand its membership and competence. China and Russia had for some time made known their opposition to the inclusion of “The Situation in Myanmar” on the agenda of the Security Council. The decision of the US to press for a vote is nonetheless puzzling. Even so the result may have cleared the air, might induce a sense of realism within Myanmar and internationally, and could even prove a blessing in disguise in the longer term. There are still important channels for action over Myanmar, notably through a continuation of visits by UN Under-Secretary General Gambari, through a greater involvement by ASEAN as well as though the operations of the various UN agencies in Myanmar. The junta will not have an easy ride, however, and their need to taken serious action on forced labour issues which are high on the agenda of the ILO and the ever-decreasing living standards among a generally impoverished population are indeed urgent issues.
12. Promoting rights in exile: Lessons from ‘outside’ human rights defenders
Since 1988, the number of human rights and political researchers in exile from Burma has grown substantially, and in quality. While often dismissed by the military government in Burma (and derided occasionally as ‘terrorists’) and by some international observers as an irrelevant or ‘privileged’ elite, many exiled or border based groups have important lessons to share with the growth of civil society inside Burma during a future transitional government. First, while many of the exiled human rights groups are specialist in their organization, concerned with issues such as particular ethnic states (for example the Karen Human Rights Group), women’s rights (for example the Shan Women’s Action Network), or media, they have valuable experience to share with others and expand ‘inside’ when the time is right. Issues of capacity building, advocacy and reporting, gained from nearly two decades of work, can be shared with emerging groups inside Burma and lessons exchanged.
Secondly, the exiled groups have often been seen as the gatekeepers of knowledge regarding the rights situation in Burma. Greater interaction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ groups could broaden this information flow to incorporate marginalized voices on a range of socio-economic and political issues in the country that foreign observers and states can draw upon to build a more detailed picture of the situation in Burma. As debates on reform in Burma shift to humanitarian goals, human rights perspectives must be maintained though strengthening local groups to gather and disseminate information through expanded cooperation to achieve a more open society.
13. Smithsonian Institution and conservation collaborations in Myanmar 1994-2006
Since 1994, the Smithsonian Institution has been collaborating with partners in Myanmar on a series of projects centering on biological exploration, in-service training of Myanmar nationals, and long-term ecological studies. Smithsonian and collaborating scientists work under the assumption that transnational collaboration requires joint planning, good will between cooperators, realistic common goals, and outputs that are meaningful to Myanmar. In all of our projects, education, through training courses and mentoring of field teams of Myanmar nationals, has been a key activity. This presentation describes these collaborations briefly and discusses in greater detail twelve years of work in Chatthin Wildlife Sanctuary to build the capacity of staff and relationships with local communities.
14. Comparison of Burma’s foreign policy under the socialist regime and the present SPDC government
Burma’s foreign policy under the BSPP officially, was based on strict non-alignment with any of the super powers of the day. It also emphasized friendly relations with all of its immediate neighbors. Its non-alignment stance was so strict that it left the non-aligned movement because it felt that the movement was too aligned when the conference was held in Havana, Cuba. But when it came to close and friendly relations with its neighbors, the non-alignment policy was compromised as was the case with China. Therefore, one had to separate relations with China from Burma’s general foreign policy stance. Another dichotomy of Burma’s foreign policy was its view of relations with ASEAN and that of its neighbors during the Ne Win era. Burma at that time refused to join ASEAN despite several invitations by the group and yet claimed to promote good relations with its neighbors.
Initially after the 1988 upheaval, Burma’s foreign policy formulation was based entirely on trying to obtain recognition of the military government’s legitimacy to govern. This time they were bending over backwards to be part of ASEAN. However, at present, due to international pressure from several fronts they have become more desperate in their efforts just to sustain their hold on power. An analysis will be made on the reasons for the change in the foreign policies of the Ne Win era and the present military government; the motivations that brought about these changes and the different methods of foreign policy formulation.
15. China and CLMV countries: Relations in the Mekong sub-region
This paper depicts and analyses the relationship between CLMV and China and its role in developing the Mekong. The background history of the development of Mekong region is mentioned in the paper’s introduction section. The relationship between China and CLMV in the political sphere is warm and cordial in the sense that three out of the sub-regional group of Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation (GMS) are socialist countries (China, Lao PDR and Vietnam) ruled by their respective communist parties. Myanmar is ruled by the military junta and the relation between China and Myanmar has been very warm since 1988 when the present regime took over power. It could be said that since the end of the cold war the sub-region has achieved relative peace and stability.
In the economic sphere, the economic cooperation among them increased significantly in terms of trade, particularly cross-border trade. Since these countries became the members of GMS, their economies performed significantly well in terms of GDP and growth rates.
In short, the important achievements of GMS include trust and confidence building among the riparian countries and these transformed the Mekong sub-region “from battle fields into market place”.
16. Inertia, political correctness and opportunism
Meaningful political development in Burma has arguably been in suspension since the 1962 coup. The country continues to be isolated from the ways and realities of the outside world, and its regime engages in little but dismissive and defensive debates with outsiders. Both the ruling military and ordinary Burmese have failed to find any sort of accommodation that will allow new ground to be broken. Indeed, there are grounds for believing that neither side really knows what to do next to break the deadlock – a problem which exiled Burmese and informed foreign observers have been unable to mediate. The outside world’s approach has been schizophrenic and selfish. Boycotts, sanctions and rebukes from the West principally have been countered by self-serving approaches from India and China and muddled diplomacy from Asean. The world was bemused by forgotten Burma’s attempt at a democratic spring in 1988, and continues to muddle along, offering nothing more than politically correct, but utterly ineffective, responses or economic carpet-bagging – and in come cases both. There needs to be a collective recognition that Burma as a nation has failed in almost all respects, and that a more responsible, consistent and practical collective approach needs to be formulated and respected by all parties involved. The peace brokered in Cambodia in the 1990s demonstrates that truly multilateral approaches to entrenched problems can work.
17. Natural resource abundance in Burma: A curse on reforms?
Burma’s rich natural resources include fertile agricultural land, a range of minerals, oil and gas, marine products and extensive forests. Resource dependence of Burmese economy is very substantial as the country's agricultural sector produces nearly 60% of GDP and it employs 63% of the country's total labor force as recently as in 2001. Despite of such resource abundance, long-term economic growth of Burma has been very poor. In fact, Burmese economy declined gradually from relatively dynamic economy of 1950s to a least-developed country by 1987. The military government introduced open-door policy in 1989 following the popular uprisings against general decline of living standards under the socialist regime. However, the economic door was open only selectively to foreign investors in investing in various kinds of extractive industries in exploring and exporting Burma’s rich natural resources previously untapped under socialist isolation. This presentation analyzes how natural resource abundance in Burma has postponed essential economic and political reforms in the country. It provides explanations on how natural resource abundance has affected political and economic landscape in the country. The presentation concludes with an exploration of future scenarios and policy implications on the international efforts of promoting democracy in Burma.
18. Community attitudes toward three protected areas in Upper Myanmar (Burma)
We examined the attitudes of 2,915 residents in 97 communities around three protected areas (PAs) in upper Myanmar: Alaungdaw Kathapa National Park in the western mountains, Htamanthi Wildlife Sanctuary in the hills bordering the Chindwin and Uru rivers, and Chatthin Wildlife Sanctuary in the central dry zone. Using logistic regression, we found a positive attitude toward the parks was most highly correlated with a perception of conservation benefits and benefits resulting from management of the areas. Attitude was also significantly correlated with a perception of extraction benefits, conflicts with PA staff, and crop damage by wildlife. Socio-economic variables were less powerful than perceptions in predicting attitude and, unlike perceptions, their effects varied among the areas. The much greater effect of perceptions, especially positive ones, on people’s attitudes indicates that understanding perceptions is important to improving the relationship between local residents and these PAs. This finding underscores the fact that a focus on conflicts to understand people’s attitudes toward PAs may undervalue or miss critical positive perceptions that people hold. Understanding local residents’ perceptions of PAs makes possible the creation of strategic, place-based management strategies that build on people’s positive perceptions and mitigate their negative perceptions.
19. Buddhism and democracy: First steps on a middle path
The interaction of Buddhism and democracy is an area that has been almost completely ignored by political theorists. In fact, it is only recently that democratic theorists have begun to explore in more detail the fruitful areas of comparison and overlap between democracy and non-Western political theories. Often this requires moving beyond the assumptions of liberalism since many aspects of these systems are incompatible with liberal ideas. In this paper I describe the beginnings of a theory of Buddhist democracy by finding concepts within Buddhist theory and practice that support or are compatible with elements of democratic theory, arguing not only that Buddhism is incompatible with several key elements of liberalism, but that an alternative version of democratic thought derived from Buddhism can address several limitations of liberalism.
I investigate the potential of tathagathagarbha (Buddha Nature) theory in providing a framework for moral equality outside of the context of a rights-bearing autonomous individual. This component of Buddhist thought also has implications for a more active conception of political equality, requiring that a minimum of necessary conditions be filled in order to allow for practice and realization of Buddha Nature. This reading of tathagathagarbha theory suggests the development of a ‘differential equality’ as a means to address social, economic and political inequalities. In addition, I use the work of other scholars on democratic practices in the early Buddhist sangha (monastic community) to show the possibility of participatory democracy within Buddhist thought and the effects that this might have on conceptions of the self.
Democracy has almost completely failed to consolidate and stabilize in Southeast Asia (the recent military coup in Thailand is only one example) and it is increasingly necessary to re-conceptualize the basic elements of a democratic system within a Buddhist context. This paper begins to address that need while also providing a commentary on liberalism and offering a different set of values on which to base a democratic community.
20. Governance for harmony in Asia: The degenerate case of Myanmar
In common with many contemporary Asian governments, Myanmar’s military junta makes frequent appeals to harmony. However, incessant demands that the nation cultivate a narrowly-conceived and centrally-imposed unity make this a degenerate case of governance for harmony, in which militaristic calls for discipline, strength and vigilance hold sway. Through an exploration of the Myanmar case, the paper examines the claims of harmony to a place in the pantheon of political concepts alongside justice, rights, equality, liberty, democracy and so on. It conceptualizes harmony chiefly through an analysis of the Confucian tradition, and identifies a zone of harmonious governance set on twin axes of unity/diversity and top down/bottom up conceptions of governance. It considers the Myanmar case in the context of this zone, and concludes that it falls outside it. The paper reflects on the implications for a strategy of governance for harmony, arguing that harmony is not as fundamental as many other political concepts. For such a strategy to work, it holds, there must be a reasonable balance between the opposed notions of unity and diversity on the one hand, and top-down and bottom-up approaches on the other. It argues that in deeply divided societies, the best way forward is not to pursue governance for harmony, but to entrench rights and duties in a constitution. In Myanmar, it would be preferable to set harmony talk aside and engage in explicit codification of rights, powers, responsibilities and duties.
21. Writing Aung San Suu Kyi
The most commonly asked question was always: how could anyone write a ‘full’ biography of ASSK when for the most obvious of reasons access to her is impossible? This however was the least of the problems faced. About ASSK there was no shortage of materials or willing ‘informants’. The real challenge lay in creating a strong narrative that is fair and even-handed toward her many supporters and her somewhat fewer critics alike. During the research period, it became clear to me that, with regard to effecting change in Myanmar, there is a widening gulf between idealist activists and can-do pragmatists. In this context, the UN Security Council vote of 12th January represents something of a watershed.
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Comments:
U Myo Nyunt, Perth, Western Australia, said _
Burma Digest Waing Thaw Thu/Thar myar, Mingalarbar. Keep up the good
work. Indeed Burma/Myanmar is becoming from nothingness being, evolving into a
very challenging future arena/domain. I look forward to the contributions in
thought, words and deed/action the new generation as well as some of us would
be able and capable to Burma's future.
May Peace, Stability and Progress-Prosperity be rightfully restored in our
country for the ordinary struggling mass of people living/surviving there.
Forward , do not look back, the future is ours, whether democracy or
dictatorship. Conflicts can be transformed, if we have confidence in ourselves
and respect the others. The people will win through.
Than Setkyar Heine said _
Dear Myo Nyunt, you are right, friend. The people are the only ones who will
have the LAST LAUGH. However, they are crying TODAY, mate.
How can you help to make them laugh again like in our old days?
In that respect, we need every person or individual born and bred in Burma to
contribute his part in toppling military rule in Burma. Like they say _ WE NEED
YOU!
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